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Modeling Third Party Effects of Water Rights Transfers in a Hypothetical Middle Rio
Grande Irrigation Community
Abstract
Water is a vital resource that is under pressure from increasing demands. The
pressures are further aggravated by the potential of decreases or changes in supplies, which
may result from climate change. The pressures are especially acute in dry climates such as
New Mexico. Leases and markets are means of efficiently reallocating this resource.
However, these transfers do not function well under uncertainty. Yet the current NM water
rights system, based on the prior appropriations doctrine, has a high degree of uncertainty
due to the interlocking spatiotemporal nature of water rights and the possibilities of third
party effects occurring subsequent to changes in one or more of the elements of a water right.
Flow constraints exacerbate the problem and are likely to be ongoing in light of increasing
demand and changing supplies.
One means of reducing uncertainty is to model the situation. Very few models
incorporate the ability to model water rights transfers, however. For example, a dynamic
systems model of the Middle Rio Grande (MRG) has been created and is used in public input
and education processes. This model includes physical factors but does not, as of yet,
address the uncertainties generated by water rights transfers.
This professional project will model a set of hypothetical transfer scenarios based in
the MRG basin, within a dynamic systems modeling program. This should demonstrate the
feasibility of modeling water rights transfers to reduce uncertainty. Addition of this aspect to
the full MRG model will also be discussed.
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Chapter 1: Water, water… not everywhere.
Introduction
Water is a vital resource that is under pressure from increasing demands on finite
supplies; the pressures are further aggravated by potential decreases or changes in supply.
This problem is acute in dry climates such as the U.S. desert Southwest and New Mexico
(NM). Population and environmental protection drive growth in demand. In addition to
the cycles of periodic drought that reduce supply, climate change is likely to exaggerate
the extremes and change timings of supplies [John R. D'Antonio, 2006]. Water quality is
also an issue; while drinking water remains relatively reliable in terms of cleanliness
from bacteria and other pathogens, pharmaceuticals, hormones, household chemicals and
similar pollutants are entering ecosystems and water supplies [W.Kolpin, et al., 2002]. It
is possible that the 21st century will see conflict over water within nations and
internationally; however, water can also be a route to peace [Ohlsson, 1997]. Locally,
people are increasingly attempting to figure out how best to reallocate water to more
efficient uses as one means of stretching our supply.
One possible solution is to allow markets in water as a means of efficiently
reallocating this resource. However, markets do not function well under uncertainty. Yet
the current NM water rights structure, based on the Prior Appropriations (PA) doctrine,
has a high degree of uncertainty due to the interlocking spatiotemporal nature of water
rights and the possibilities of third party effects (TPE). TPE stem from changes in one or
more elements of a water right upon transfer, causing loss to a party uninvolved in the
transfer. TPE are particularly likely under flow constraints. Flow constraints, in turn, are
liable to be ongoing in light of increasing demands and potentially changing supplies.
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One means of reducing uncertainty is to model the situation. For example, the
middle Rio Grande (MRG) system is being modeled in a systems dynamics program by
researchers at UNM and Sandia National Labs (hereafter referred to as the Sandia model)
[Passell, et al., 2003]. This research focuses on the relatively course basin scale, thereby
missing interactions at the fine scale of individual water rights holders. Yet it is at both
the finer and coarser scales that water rights transfers occur. An informal transfer
between farmers is an example of the finest of scales, while large transfers of agricultural
water to municipal use occurs at the basin scale. However, this transfer can also be
composed of multiple higher-resolution transfers by individual irrigators. Modeling these
processes occurring within the basin scale is necessary to understand adjudication and
allocation processes [Matthews, et al., 2001] and to reduce uncertainty. However,
creating a model where all systems are modeled at the same fine scale would be
cumbersome and not necessarily be an improvement. The ideal would be to model the
fine scale within the basin scale.
Description of Problem
The vital importance of water to life and the mismatch between demand and
supply make water a valuable resource. To best protect and manage it, we must
understand the interacting biophysical, socioeconomic and cultural systems that affect it.
Many of these have been well studied, but the water rights system has had little attention.
New Mexico water rights are a complex set of interacting spatiotemporal pieces
similar to a jigsaw puzzle in which each piece represents an individual water right. Each
puzzle piece’s area represents the diversionary entitlement of that right, and the shape
represents other spatiotemporal variables such as timing of return flows [Gould, 1988]. I
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would extend this analogy to the location of each piece relative to other pieces and the
puzzle overall, which is similar to the interrelationships of priorities, place of use, and
point of diversion. These interrelationships form a spatially complex legal and physical
topology [Matthews, et al., 2001].
When water supply is abundant relative to demand, there is not a serious problem.
However, as demands increase, or as drought decreases the supply, flow constraints come
into play. At any point of diversion, the stream flow must be greater than the required
diversion in order to satisfy the right [Gisser, 2002b]. Additionally, sufficient water must
remain for carriage losses and downstream users. But once the balance between demand
and supply becomes tight, flow constraints become binding on users under the PA water
rights system, and transfers will result in third-party impairments. During a situation of
flow constraints, “location along the stream does matter” [Johnson, et al., 1981].
Water flow involves space and time, and the locations and timings of physical
diversions and return flows ties together upstream and downstream users. Additionally,
the priority date of the right holder has a temporal element in determining order of water
allotment, and a spatial element as the rights holders of varying seniorities are
intermixed. As water is mobile, more than one party may use the same molecule of
water. Therefore, transfers between two parties can impair other parties who are not
involved in the deal; that is, third-party effects.
If one piece (water right) in the puzzle is changed, other pieces (water rights
holders) that are not directly involved in the transfer may be impaired. These third-party
effects may involve partial or total loss of the water supply, or a change in timing of that
supply. Between the interlocking socio-cultural interactions and the variability of
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biophysical processes, uncertainty at the fine-scale level of the individual water-right
owner is high, reducing the possibility of water rights holders changing their water use
patterns, even if a favorable alternative to current uses exists. Examples will be discussed
in the following chapter; see also Gould (1988) and Matthews, et al. (2001).
Understanding what happens at the level of individual and small-community (e.g.
a small irrigation district) water rights holders is important. At this scale the actions – or
non-actions – of individuals or small groups will in large part determine the success or
failure of proposed state, regional and federal water re-allocation solutions, such as
efficiency measures, voluntary transfers or water markets. Yet this spatiotemporal puzzle
is missed by the courser resolution of the Sandia model. Therefore, a spatially and
temporally explicit, high-resolution model of the water rights system should be integrated
into the basin scale model.
This fine scale water rights model could be integrated with a basin scale model to
explore how the system reacts to changes such as water rights transfers. Doing so will
aid in understanding the fine-scale system and its interactions with the larger system.
Having a model which includes water rights would help policy makers by providing more
information while developing solutions to our water problems. Hopefully such a model
would also help reduce uncertainty for water rights holders, so they will be more
comfortable making decisions.
As a first step in determining if such a model is feasible, a prototype will be built.
Modeling this system is not an easy task. The temporal dynamic modeling software
packages such as that used in the Sandia Model are not spatial in the manner of a GIS.
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However, they can be given a basic spatial structure. Secondly, the model should also be
able to integrate with models such as the MRG basin model.
Research Objectives
This project involves building a fine scale spatiotemporal prototype model of a
hypothetical community of water rights holders, set in the Middle Rio Grande. Once
built, running transfer scenarios in this model can provide information on third party
effects of water rights transfers. Also, the model will be structured to demonstrate how a
similar fine scale system can be integrated with the basin scale Sandia Model.
Integrating such a system with the Sandia model would ultimately aid in reducing
uncertainty. The objective is to demonstrate that it is feasible to model TPE and also to
discuss how this type of model can be integrated for use with the Sandia Model.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
There are several areas that provide a background to this project, including
hydrology, water law, economics and modeling. While there is ample literature in the
general fields listed above, there is less research on the interlocking effects of Prior
Appropriation (PA) water rights or on modeling these systems. A small number of
articles are found in the Geography and modeling literatures.
Geography
Water runs through the many fields of Geography. Hydrologic features are found
on most maps, and the influence of water shows in terrain profiles. The water cycle is a
fundamental element in physical geography, including geomorphology, weather and
climate, and ecosystems. Patterns of human geography are also influenced by water (e.g.
settlement along rivers for agriculture) and humans in turn influence the hydrological
cycle by their actions, such as dam building. Geographical features and processes
strongly affect water use and water rights, and the human institutional and cultural
structures related to water in turn affect the landscape.
Despite the interesting history of western water and difficult problems of water
allocation and reallocation in the southwestern U.S., there seems to be little geographic
literature on this aspect. These include articles by Matthews [Matthews, 1984; 2003;
2004; 2005] and three Masters theses [LeScournac, 2000; Pease, 2002; Zoldak, 1997].
The first thesis investigated the Aamodt suit, which is a water rights adjudication
in the Pojoaque river basin of northern New Mexico. Multiple stakeholder groups and
individuals own water rights with priorities ranging from the oldest (Pueblo) to recent
times, and both surface and ground water is involved. Furthermore, a variety of legal
6

rules apply in this case, some of which are still under dispute [LeScournac, 2000]. These
interacting factors create a complex situation, which well illustrates the difficulty of
modeling such a scenario.
The second thesis discussed legal issues around interstate transfer of water rights,
specifically, a hypothetical transfer of water rights from willing sellers in San Luis
Valley, CO, to buyers in the northern New Mexico (defined as above Elephant Butte).
The feasibility from the delivery and economic standpoints was found to be good, and
legal aspects were discussed. The final conclusion was that transfers of this sort will be
likely as time passes [Pease, 2002].
The last thesis used GIS to model water rights in the Gila [Zoldak, 1997]; this
work will be discussed later in this chapter. Use of GIS in modeling the MRG was also
suggested in an article which also discussed the topological implications of water rights
in the PA system [Matthews, et al., 2001]. A thorough discussion of third party effects in
a spatial perspective was also provided by Gould (1988), as has already been discussed.
The major source of PA water rights information in Geography is Matthews. He
investigates the geographies and legalities of water in the U.S., including the prior
appropriation states of the West and native water rights [Matthews, 1984]. He also calls
attention to the questions that arise from “mud rules” occurring from human attempts to
manage this mobile resource. Questions occur at the interface of physical and
institutional realities. For example, as water moves through the hydrological cycle, how
does the institutional view of it change? Water in the atmosphere is ignored, while
diffuse surface water is fuzzy and can fall under the land rights or water laws, depending
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on the local law [Matthews, 2004]. Groundwater is not exempt - spatial variability and
multiple levels of authority lead to conflicts as well [Matthews, 2005].
Ultimately, it may be easier to change the property rights structure, and provide
for TPE by associating two values with each entitlement, the diversionary volume and a
discount rate, an added amount of water that would be sufficiently substantial to
circumvent the need for determinations of TPE on every transfer, case-by-case
[Matthews, 2003]. In the meantime, however, modeling may provide a means to help
determine TPE. The questions of relationships and obligations [Matthews, 2004]
between parties are the center of this project.
Western Water Rights Law
To distribute water amongst people, civilizations have developed governing
principles ranging from religious to legal. In Bali, for example, a highly sophisticated
system of temples controls the release of water through extensive irrigation networks.
This system has developed over time to irrigate the rice crop and control pests [Rogers,
1995]. Legal systems include the Riparian Rights doctrine of the eastern US, which
descended from the English common law, and in the West, the Prior Appropriation (PA)
doctrine that arose via mining law [Pisani, 1996]. This later doctrine is the “first in time,
first in right” means of apportioning water. PA ensures the property rights of the senior
user, while also providing protections for junior users [Gould, 1988]. Additional layers
of treaty and law regulate other facets such as Native American water rights and
environmental protections.
Under the laws of Spanish New Mexico, running water belonged to the Crown.
The Spanish colonial community ditch systems which formed are known as acequias
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[Pisani, 1996]. Around 1,000 acequias could be found in upland and intermountain NM
[Brown and Rivera, 2000]. Active acequias remain to this day, and one of the issues in
water rights transfers is maintaining the acequias, their culture and traditions.
These pre-Anglo communities had different means of adjusting needs to the
resource’s fluctuating availability [Pisani, 1996], and the resultant potential for
uncertainty and conflict. Conflicts were resolved within the group. Individual users had
a water right, but the group, to preserve and protect that right, also held a collective right.
Construction was a communal affair [Brown and Rivera, 2000], and upkeep was done by
the beneficiaries, who provided labor in proportion to their land. Acequias were managed
by a watermaster elected by landowners (today known as a majordomo). This
watermaster was to distribute the resource equitably, based on acreage and crop type
[Pisani, 1996].
While it is commonly believed that the doctrine of prior appropriation arose in the
West as a means to deal with the arid climate, that was only part of the reason (Pisani,
1996). The origins of PA lie in the development of mining. Originally, miners diverted
water from streams to expose the streambed to reach the placer deposits. But as these
easily accessible resources ran out, the nature of water diversions changed. Water was
diverted long distances, to wash away topsoil and expose ancient streambeds.
Additionally, water was needed to separate gold from the riverbed gravel.
It was to the benefit of the miners to gain private property rights under a PA
system. Additionally, since mining was primarily an activity carried out on public lands,
PA allowed disseisin rights. These allow a landholder to evict a trespasser when a third
party holds title to the land. In this case, the miners on public lands were disseisors of the
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U.S. government, which also gave them priority (over later comers) for both minerals and
water. Thus, although not all miners were in favor of this system, it came to be.
In the 1870s- 1880s, large private irrigation projects were also growing. While
forms of riparian rights doctrine (commonly associated with Eastern states water laws)
existed in the West, eventually the PA doctrine dominated.
Later, the territorial legislature cited irrigation as the primary use of water in NM.
Signed in 1848, the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hildalgo reaffirmed pre-existing water rights
when the territory was transferred to US control. In multiple sessions from 1851 to 1880,
it again reaffirmed and even expanded this system. These rights were additionally
confirmed in the state constitution:
“Section 1. [Existing water rights confirmed.] All existing rights to the
use of any waters in this state for any useful or beneficial purpose are hereby
recognized and confirmed.” - Article XVI [1911]
In 1870, however, the legislature also gave private companies the right to run
ditches. As conflicts arose, the law moved towards prior appropriation as a solution.
Today, the law governing water remains under PA, as stated in the Constitution:
“Section 2 [Appropriation of water.] The unappropriated water of every
natural stream, perennial or torrential, within the state of New Mexico, is herby
declared to belong to the public and to be subject to appropriation for beneficial
use, in accordance with the laws of the state. Priority of appropriation shall give
the better right.” - Article XVI [1911]
Additionally, an excerpt from New Mexico statutes:
“72-1-1. Natural waters; public. All natural waters flowing in streams and
watercourses, whether such be perennial, or torrential, within the limits of the
state of New Mexico, belong to the public and to be subject to appropriation for
beneficial use. A watercourse is hereby defined to be any river, creek, arroyo,
canyon, draw or wash, or any other channel having definite banks and bed with
visible evidence of the occasional flow of water.”
Note that
10

‘Section 3. [Beneficial use of water] Beneficial use shall be the basis, the
measure and the limit of the right to the use of water.
‘Section 4. [Drainage districts and systems.] The legislature is authorized
to provide by law for the organization and operation of drainage districts and
systems.”

Prior appropriation, which governs water rights in New Mexico, is part of the
state constitution and reinforced in statute, as shown in the excerpts above. In addition to
the priority date, the elements of the right are diversionary entitlement (flow diversion),
purpose and place and time of use, and point of diversion. While the priority date acts as
a protection for the senior water rights holder, other aspects of a water right provide
protection to the juniors.
These other elements, especially the diversionary entitlement, provide the junior
with certain protections against changes in the stream in relation to how he/she found it.
For example, an upstream senior cannot increase their use by virtue of their seniority,
thereby depriving a downstream user of legitimate rights. Priority and diversionary
entitlement are fixed, and while the other three elements are changeable, they are subject
to the “no injury” rule, which can block a change or transfer, or impose conditions to
mitigate an injury to a junior user from a senior’s actions [Gould, 1988].
Priority was considered to be a means of ensuring economic development by
providing these protections to the irrigators’ investments of time and money. However,
others see prior appropriation as “… grossly inefficient as a tool to parcel out a scarce
resource”[Pisani, 1996]. Today, most western water is fully allocated (or over allocated)
and conflicts brew. Perhaps it is unsurprising that many of the parciantes, or irrigatormembers of acequias, prefer to retain the old systems [Brown and Rivera, 2000].
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Prior Appropriation and Third Party Effects
Two papers [Matthews, et al., 2001] and [Gould, 1988] examine the
spatiotemporal topologies of priority-based water rights, as discussed in chapter one. In
short, water flow and priority dates involve space and time, and the placement and timing
of diversions and return flows is an interlocking system. Under flow constraint
conditions, transfers by one party that change the place and/or time of use of that party’s
water, can affect another party.
The simplest example is the upstream user increasing use or transferring it out of
the basin, decreasing available flow downstream. Likewise, an upstream user who
changes the time of use may change the time of return flows, thus changing downstream
availability temporally. The total amount of water may not change, but if the timing of
the downstream user’s needs was dependant on the upstream user’s original time of use,
the downstream user may again be affected. Other combinations of changes and effects
can be more complex, and the directionality of effects can run upstream as well.
Scenarios are described in the methodology, see also Gould [1988] and Matthews, et al.
[2001].
Water Markets
Water is a scarce resource in the southwest, and economics is the science of the
allocation and reallocation of scare resources among diverse consumer goals [Gisser,
2002a]. One of the proposed solutions for the difficulties of water reallocation in New
Mexico is to enhance the market for water or water rights. A water market “consists of
the interactions of actual and potential buys and sellers of one or more interrelated water
commodities” [Saliba and Bush, 1987].

12

There are preconditions for markets to work. These include certainty (of quantity,
quality, location and timing of availability), few externalities (another term which in this
case means TPE), and the flexibility to reallocate in response to changing conditions.
Particularly with adjudicated rights, the PA system does provide some degree of certainty
on supply, but the uncertainty arising from interdependence of water rights does cause
externalities. Establishing the absence of TPE is costly both in time and money, and is
likely a reason water transfers do not occur, even when differences in value for water use
exist [Easter, et al., 1998]. However, water has a low marginal value [Saliba and Bush,
1987], which also makes it less worthwhile to pursue transfers.
To build efficient markets, institutions need to be designed to accommodate the
mobile nature of water and create accurate incentives. Regardless, water users need
protection against TPE [Easter, et al., 1998]. New Mexico has already seen water
transfers, and has potential for larger water markets. A PA water right establishes a welldefined tradable property right. However, many rights still need to be finalized
(adjudicated) by the state engineer, before they are easily tradable [Brookshire, et al.,
2004]. Interestingly, the NM State Engineer’s administrative system for water rights
reallocation is mentioned as an example of a “quite efficient” system that keeps
transaction costs low [Easter, et al., 1998].
Alternatively, some authors [Dellapena, 2000] contend that water markets are not
feasible and that the name “market” is used to describe certain situations that aren’t truly
markets. Regardless, if a water market is possible in NM, it will take a while to mature
and to internalize the externalities, especially given the pace of adjudications. In the
meantime, the water model is one way to reduce the TPE externality.
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Of particular interest to this project, one author [Gisser, 2002a] argues that water
rights can be freely traded in the market under the prior appropriation system, in the
absence of flow constraints. However, “overallocation”, which is the current status of
our water supply, is essentially synonymous with “flow constraints”. Furthermore, the
increasing demands on the resource – instream flows, population and more – and the
variability of the source – drought, climate change – mean flow constraints are here to
stay.
Previous Models of Water Rights Under Prior Appropriations
Modeling human-environmental systems is a difficult undertaking with unique
characteristics [Grove, et al., 2002]. The systems dynamic software is temporal but
aspatial, while the spatial software such as GIS does not have a strong time dimension.
Thus, considerable discussion occurs over coupling of GIS and dynamic environmental
models [Clarke, et al., 2002; Goodchild, et al., 1993].
To date, little research exists that attempts to model third party effects of priority
water rights, and that which exists neither uses systems dynamics programming nor
investigates the MRG basin. Additionally, while the literature describes the models, it
does not discuss modeling of TPE arising from specific transfer scenarios. Three types of
models that include water rights were found: Network Flow Programming (NFP) [Isreal
and Lund, 1999], the Texas Water Rights Analysis Package (WRAP) [Wurbs, 2001;
Wurbs and Sanchez-Torres, 1996], and a GIS [Zoldak, 1997] model.
Network Flow Programming (NFP) is used to model reservoirs and other systems.
NFP was applied to a system of water rights priorities in the Truckee-Carson system
[Isreal and Lund, 1999]. While the scale in this study was of reservoirs, it could easily be
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used at the individual level. However, hydrologic, biophysical and socioeconomic
parameters are missing in this model. It may be possible to incorporate some of the
missing hydrologic parameters, such as carriage loss, into the location connectivity
matrix as fractional values, but this approach is very crude relative to other models, and
would not include feedbacks in the system. Socioeconomic factors would be even more
difficult to integrate. Furthermore, the determination of cost coefficients in NFP is not
systematic and does not guarantee that priorities and rights are preserved. These
problems, along with the issue of integration into a systems dynamics model, shows that
NFP is clearly insufficient for this project.
Wurbs [Wurbs, 2001; Wurbs and Sanchez-Torres, 1996] discusses the
development of the Texas WRAP under the Water Availability Modeling (WAM)
project. The objective of WAM was to develop a system of software and databases to be
used by various parties interested in water management. The Texas Natural Resource
Conservation Commission (TNRCC) uses this system to evaluate new water rights
applications and changes in existing rights, both of which it must approve. WRAP is also
available to other agencies, consultancy firms and groups for planning and permit
applications. Texas WRAP is a FORTRAN- based simulation model that uses hydrology
and water rights inputs at river basin or multiple-basin scales to assess “hydrologic and
institutional water availability and reliability for existing and proposed water rights”
[Wurbs, 2001].
The WRAP is spatially configured as a set of control points. In an earlier version
[Wurbs and Sanchez-Torres, 1996] the Brazos River Basin, the second largest watershed
in Texas, was simulated with only 12 control points – an unacceptably high aggregation
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for this project. Control points in the newer version [Wurbs, 2001] number from a few to
over 1,000 per basin. The time step is monthly and the duration selection is user-defined.
WRAP would have been worth investigating at the start of the MRG modeling
project, as it is generalized model with the flexibility to be used elsewhere [Wurbs, 2001].
However, it would be difficult to integrate a WRAP-based water rights model with the
Powersim-based Sandia model already in existence. Thus, WRAP is ruled out for this
project.
Lastly, a model of individual water rights in the Gila basin was created in a GIS
as a Masters thesis [Zoldak, 1997]. This model determined stream flow, calculated the
diversionary rights and their effects on streamflow, and allowed manipulation of
diversions, minimum flows and land cover. Thus, it should be possible to compare
effects of transfers. However, limitations exist in this model, one of which is an
unacceptably long run time of a few hours per scenario (O.P. Matthews, personal
communication, 2005). Subsequent improvements in computing power would help, but
changes in GIS software likely renders the programming obsolete. While a new program
can be written, there are also problems with the spatiotemporal structure to consider.
Spatially, stream segments were arranged by the Core-Periphery Numeric
Positional (CPNP) ordering system, which assigns a unique ID to each stream segment by
location. Diversions were assumed to be from the closest stream segment, and the return
was assumed to be the next downstream segment. This restricts the spatial topologies to
a potentially artificial arrangement. Additionally, diversions were simultaneous at each
segment, regardless of the time of use [Zoldak, 1997]. Nevertheless, there are useful
elements to investigate, should the MRG or any water rights model be built in a GIS.
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These models all offer intriguing ideas but none would be easily integrated into
the target Sandia model. Thus a prototype must be developed with a structure that will
facilitate coupling with the Sandia model. While it does not yet have water rights as a
part of its scenario, this functionality would be useful given the model’s purpose.
Systems Dynamics and the Sandia Model
Dynamic modeling is useful as it allows us to understand real-world dynamics
using “simplified forces that are assumed to result in a system’s behavior” [Hannon and
Ruth, 2001]. Starting from an specified set of initial conditions, the computer models the
system’s responses according to the interrelationships of the model components [Hannon
and Ruth, 2001].
Any systems dynamics model is built up of individual components connected
together into the overall system to be modeled. The major components are state and
control variables. A state variable, or stock, is an accumulation of some material.
Examples include water, a species population, money or some other unit. The control
variable, also known as a flow, updates the stock at each time step. Translation variables
or converters provide additional information used in controlling the interactions, and are
connected by information arrows [Hannon and Ruth, 2001]. Flows in and out of stocks
can be controlled by a simple constant, an equation, or a graphical function.
The Sandia model is a systems dynamics model built in Powersim. It was
developed with input from a wide range of stakeholders to assist in community-based
water planning for the Middle Rio Grande (MRG) Basin. The challenge was to balance
the highly variable supply among competing demands in the three county region
(Bernalillo, Sandoval and Valencia counties), and link science and policy. The model is

17

not meant to be the means of decision making, but rather as an aid to dialog and decision
making [Passell, et al., 2003]. In this regard, it is a decision support system (DSS).
The high level structure consists of two water budgets, surface and ground water.
These vary according to interactions between themselves, and with other in- and outflows
occurring within the region. Some details must also be simulated outside the basin as
calculation inputs to the region [Passell, et al., 2003].
The model includes hydrological, ecological and economic factors, however, it
only deals with “wet” water – that is actual water in the system that is available for use.
It does not account for water rights, adjudications or similar aspects [Passell, et al., 2003]
or traditional and cultural values [Tidwell, et al., 2004]. Users make adjustments in a
variety of parameters, and when run, the model shows the baseline – a no-action, default
alternative – and the results of the user’s changes. This allows people to make more
informed decisions. Integration of a water rights system to this model is a useful goal.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
This project involves creating a model of a hypothetical community of water
rights holders, with spatially intermixed priority dates, diversions and return flow points;
some of which will be altered in a set of transfer scenarios. When run, the model yields
information on the third party effects of water rights transfers. The model design also
considers future integration with the Sandia model. This chapter will describe the study
area, outline general and specific model parameters and transfer scenarios modeled.
Description of Study Area
The model is set in two consecutive reaches of the MRG, the San Felipe to
Central Avenue (Albuquerque) reach (herein called Reach 1) and Central to Bernardo
reach (Reach 2). The characteristics of the MRG have been well studied and the basin is
well-documented [Bartolino and Cole, 2002; MRGWA, 1999; USACoE, 2005; USACoE
and ISC, 2004]; this description will cover those aspects pertinent to the model.
The San Felipe reach includes Hydrologic Unit Codes (HUC) 13020201 to
13020203, running from river mile1572.7 to 1540.0, and has a drainage of 1340 acres.
The Reach 2 is in HUC 13020203, covering river miles 1540.0 to 1487.2 and drains 1790
acres [USACoE, 2005].
In addition to mainstem inflows, both reaches have surface inflows from urban
wastewater plants [Bartolino and Cole, 2002], with Reach A also receiving inflows from
the Jemez River, and Reach B from the Tijeras Arroyo. Precipitation is fairly uniform
over the region; the two reaches fall within NM Zone Three [USACoE and ISC, 2004],
Climate Division five, Central Valley. Each climate zone is a group of divisions within
each state that are relatively homogenous, and in the western states, boundaries generally
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follow watershed divisions [DOE, 2007; NOAA, 2007]. This is a semiarid continental
climate.
The groundwater system includes a deep and a shallow aquifer [Bartolino and
Cole, 2002]. While there is groundwater inflow to the river from the shallow aquifer, the
Rio Grande is a net loosing stream in both reaches [Bartolino and Cole, 2002; Turney,
1991; USACoE, 2005]. In addition to seepage, evapotranspiration (ET) is a significant
outflow. Riparian and agricultural ET rates are slightly different for the two reaches
[USACoE and ISC, 2004], as are seepage rates [USACoE, 2005]. Riparian vegetation
includes Bosque cottonwoods as well as the invasive salt-cedar and Russian olive.
Agriculture is the major water user, and the main crops by acreage are alfalfa and pasture.
The variety of other crops range from chile to corn and grapes to orchards [USACoE,
2005].
Model Design
This model is built in STELLA 8, a dynamic simulation program that works on
the same principles as the Powersim software used for the Sandia project. The diagram
below is a generalized schematic of the model, which is also described in this section.
The program code and STELLA model structure can be found in the accompanying CD
file and in Appendixes A and B.
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P,S,G

SanFelipe

ET,G

Reach 1

Reach 2

Lat.1

Lat.2

Bernardo

Lateral 3

Figure 1. Generalized model diagram of the two Rio Grande reaches between San Felipe
and Bernardo, NM. Initials P, S, G and ET represent precipitation, surface inflows
(tributaries and wastewater), groundwater and evapotranspiration respectively.

The two reaches on the main stem of the RG are represented by two stocks. This
allows both within reach and between reach transfers. Natural inflows to the river
include the mainstem, tributaries, surface runoff, precipitation and groundwater. Humans
also provide a major source of inflows from wastewater. Natural outflows include
riparian ET, groundwater (exacerbated by pumping) and the mainstem. The irrigation
system diversions are outflows, and returns, less consumptive use and other losses are
modeled as inflows.
The groundwater system is not directly modeled in this prototype, as it focuses on
the surface waters. However, groundwater fluxes are represented and controls can be
added to modify results due to actions such as changes in pumping.
The three stocks labeled as laterals represent three sets of irrigators or irrigation
communities connected to the reaches, such that two sets were within the reach, and the
third set stretched between reaches. There are 11 irrigators, three each in Laterals One
and Two, and five in Lateral Three. Each irrigator is represented by a stock representing
the farm field. (This can also be considered as a black box representing a small
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homogenous group of irrigators on a smaller branch of the canal system.) The irrigator
diverts water from the main canal some of which goes to the agricultural Consumptive
Use (CU). CU includes evapotranspiration (ET), and the return is a function of CU
efficiency. Return flows consist of the water remaining after CU. The diversion of water
occurs from the basin scale model represented by the two reaches, into the fine scale
irrigation system, and after running through the irrigation communities, returns to the
basin scale model via return flows.
The basic structure of the chain of diversions, fields and returns is shown below.
Diversions to and returns from the fields must flow from and to stocks, as flows cannot
connect with flows. Thus, the irrigation lateral is represented by a series of stocks as well
as the connecting flows. Each field in the model was assigned a hypothetical crop; the
most common crop types were used (alfalfa, pasture, orchard, corn, oats). The acreage
for each crop in each lateral was based on 1% of actual acreage size in the reach (based
on URGWOM data). Likewise, the canal loss was set to approximately 1% of the total
seepage. The CU is calculated for each crop based on the acreage and the CU for the
respective reaches. Then, a diversionary right was calculated as the CU (acreage times
rate) divided by the efficiency.
Irrigation efficiency is the percent of the water available for consumptive use.
Farm irrigation efficiency is measured at the headgate, and ranges from 45% in open
porous soil to 65% in medium loam [Blaney and Hanson, 1965]. In this prototype, all
efficiencies are set at 50%. This is currently an estimate only [S.S. Papadopulos &
Associates, 2002] and lies towards the lower end of the range.

This is also a

conservative assumption, because if TPE can be shown at low efficiencies and high
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return flows, it should also be visible with higher efficiencies, where return flows are
decreased, leaving less water in the main lateral to buffer changes due to transfers.
A

Lateral Loss

B

Inflow
Diversion A

Diversion B

Div. to A

Div. to B
Ret. to B

Field A

Field B

A

Consumptive Use

Ret. to C

B

Figure 2. Diagram of representative portion of the irrigation systems. The upper stocks
allow diversions and returns to be pulled from the flow of the lateral to the fields, which
have outflows for consumptive use and return flows.
In this model, all tributaries, wastewater inflows, and groundwater fluxes are
controlled by constants derived from the literature. All evapotranspiration and
consumptive uses are controlled by the acreage multiplied by the rate for the specific
reach. Diversions into the laterals are the sum of the diversionary water rights and a
portion of the lateral loss. The portion was set to provide sufficient carriage water for all
irrigators. The total lateral loss is not used as return flows double as carriage flows.
Diversionary rights controlling diversions into the individual fields are a function of the
consumptive use divided by irrigation efficiency, and returns are the diversionary right
minus the consumptive use.
The model was designed so that absence or presence of TPE would be
immediately observable on each model run. Each stock representing an irrigator’s field
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(represented by green boxes in Figure 2 above) has one inflow (diversionary right) and
two outflows (consumptive use and return flows). In the model baseline, these fluxes to
and from the stock balance at zero and remain at this equilibrium throughout the season.
In a scenario run, fields that do not feel TPE continue to maintain this zero balance.
When a field has a deficit however, the stock representing that irrigator will drop from
zero to a new equilibrium at a negative value. This is made possible in STELLA by
turning off the “non-negative” control in the stock’s dialog box.
This design provides an immediate feedback on the existence of TPE. After a
run, a zero value indicates no TPE, while a negative value shows TPE for that field. The
numerical value of the TPE then represents the volumetric deficit of the TPE for each
day. The total deficit is simple to determine, by multiplying the daily deficit by the
number of days in the irrigation season.
Water rights priorities can be assigned to each irrigator. However, TPE can occur
under the current scenarios even if the seller holds senior water rights, as the junior is
protected by other elements of the water right. If that junior is in turn senior to another
irrigator, he does get priority over that irrigator, in which case the TPE will be passed on.
This model does not yet look past the first place TPE could occur, in order to compare
results between runs.
The model is set to run at daily increments for 200 days. This covers the frost
free period (162 days in Albuquerque [Blaney and Hanson, 1965]), with additional time
which allows for preliminary flushing and filling of the canals. To integrate the daily
time-step with the annual data, river data was divided by 365 to derive a daily flow. The
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annual irrigation rights only flow during the season, however, so irrigation system data
was divided by 200 to provide the farmer’s daily allotment.
Model Data
Data and sources are listed in Tables 1 and 2 on the following pages, with notes
providing additional information. The primary data sources were the United States
Geological Survey (USGS), the Middle Rio Grande Water Supply Study (MRGWSS),
and the Upper Rio Grande Water Operations Model (URGWOM) of the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, along with supplemental data sources.
Table one lists data used for the two river reaches, and also the evapotranspiration
rates and leakage for the irrigation system. Table two provides additional data used in
creation of the irrigation system. Model agricultural acreage is approximately 1% of
reach total in each system, based on URGWOM data. Crops listed are representative of
the most common crops by acreage. This acreage and the Consumptive use (CU) rate are
used to calculate the CU water right, that is, actual water used. The diversionary right is
equal to CU divided by Efficiency.
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Parameter
Flow
Main stem Inflow

Type
San Felipe

Value
Units
1,030,000 af/y

Source
USGS-1222

Tributaries 1 Inflow

JemezR
Bernalillo WW
Rio Rancho WW

46,000 af/y
530 af/y
780 af/y

USGS-1222
USGS-1222
USGS-1222

Tributaries 2 Inflow

Tijeras Arroyo
Albuquerque WW
Los Lunas WW
Belen WW

492 af/y
58,200 af/y
659 af/y
938 af/y

USGS-1222
USGS-1222
USGS-1222
USGS-1222

Precipitation Inflow

Rain
RG Surface Area 1
RG Surface Area 2
Drainage Area 1
Drainage Area 2

ET

Outflow

Riparian CU rate 1
Riparian CU rate 2
Agricultural CU rate 1
Agricultural CU rate 2
Riparian Area 1
Riparian Area 2
Irrigated Acreage 1
Irrigated Acreage 2
Surface Evap Rate 1
Surface Evap Rate 2

GW out

Outflow

GW Leakage 1
GW Leakage 2
Canal seepage 1
Canal seepage 2

GW In

Footnote
1

1.3 f/y
1,687 acres
3,354 acres
1,340 mi2
1,790 mi2

WRCC
MRGWSS3
MRGWSS3
URGWOM
URGWOM

2,3

3.6 af/a/y
3.6 af/a/y
3.9 af/a/y
4.0 af/a/y
5,590 acres
18,800 acres
7,000 acres
39,601 acres
5.6 af/a/y
5.5 af/a/y

MRGWSS3
MRGWSS3
MRGWSS3
MRGWSS3
MRGWSS3
MRGWSS3
MRGWSS3
MRGWSS3
MRGWSS3
MRGWSS3

4

86,942 af/y
163,867 af/y

URGWOM
URGWOM

15,200 af/y
20,990 af/y

URGWOM
URGWOM

5

USGS-1222

6

Inflow

Table 1. Model data and sources.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Taken from flows upstream from San Felipe (Cochiti), lies within the range.
Precipitation based on the past century’s average from WRCC Division 5 data.
Runoff = P x surface area x coefficient; accounts for non-tributary runoff.
ET = Area x Rate.
Scaled down to approx. 1% of total, to match irrigation system scale.
Groundwater inflow set at 75% of leakage, as ratio of overall leakage in the area
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Farm
1A
1B
1C
Total
2A
2B
2C
Total
3A
3B
3C
3D
3E
Total

Acres (a) CU rate(af/a/y)
26.5
3.9
30.5
3.9
2.4
3.9
59.4
41.5
4.0
28.4
4.0
2.7
4.0
72.6
26.5
3.9
30.5
3.9
41.5
4.0
28.4
4.0
3.3
4.0
73.2

CU (af/y) Efficiency Diversion (af/y) Crop
102.3
0.5
204.6 alfalfa
117.7
0.5
235.5 pasture
9.3
0.5
18.5 orchard
229.284
458.6
164.8
0.5
329.5 alfalfa
112.7
0.5
225.5 pasture
10.7
0.5
21.4 corn
288.2
576.4
102.3
0.5
204.6 alfalfa
117.7
0.5
235.5 pasture
164.8
0.5
329.5 alfalfa
112.7
0.5
225.5 pasture
13.1
0.5
26.2 oats
290.6
581.2

Table 2. Farm data.
Model Scenarios
A set of four water rights transfer scenarios were designed to investigate whether
TPE could be seen in the model. The scenarios, taken from the literature, are all
examples of instances of water transfers that could occur in the study area and that may
create TPE. In all cases transfers were based on the consumptive use water right, rather
than the entire diversionary right.
The first scenario involves a sale of water by an irrigator to the city. Transfers
from agriculture to municipal uses are already the dominant market direction in the
MRG, and water is likely to continue to flow in this direction [Brookshire, et al., 2004].
Furthermore, this transfer is not dissimilar to other sales, such as transferring it out of the
basin [Gould, 1988; Matthews, et al., 2001] leaving it instream for compact compliance
or environmental purposes, or allowing it to be transferred to another ditch system. All
require that the water be removed from the particular ditch. In all of these cases, there
will be a decrease in the amount of water diverted into a specific lateral or acequia,
potentially disrupting the tight interdependence of flows and users.
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The other three scenarios likewise disrupt the interrelationships, potentially
causing TPE. The second scenario involves a change in return point, such that new
returns are moved downstream of the original return point, bypassing one or more
farmers who rely on the return flows [Matthews, et al., 2001]. The third scenario
involves change in place of use within the irrigation community, thus changing the points
of diversion and return [Gould, 1988]. This can be up or downstream, and could be the
result of a landowner acquiring new land and rotating fields. Lastly, a temporal scenario
is run, where two irrigators only use water during the first part of the season, and one
decides to change the seasonal time of use [Gould, 1988]. This could occur if a crop type
is changed or if the right was sold to another use such as a ski resort upstream.
In summary, the scenarios are:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Transfer of water out of the irrigation system
Change in return flow point within the system
Change in place of use (diversion and return) within the system
Change in time of use
The first two scenarios are run multiple times. Each run uses different irrigators

or is in different laterals. These repeats investigate the same scenario under similar but
not identical situations. The second two scenarios are each run once.
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Chapter Five: Results and Beyond
The results of the scenario runs are strongly encouraging as a motivation to
continue this avenue of research with the ultimate aim of integrating water rights models
into the Sandia MRG model. The model did show Third Party Effects (TPE) in a
reasonable manner and allowed calculation of the volumes. Just as importantly, it also
demonstrated occasions when TPE did not occur. This differentiation was possible even
in similar situations, demonstrating that it is unlikely to be a function of the choice of
model structure.
The diagram below shows the topological relationships of the river, the three
laterals and the individual irrigation communities. Consumptive use rights from Table 2
are listed in each irrigation field for reference, rounded to the nearest unit.

Reach 1

Reach 2

(Lateral 1)
102

118

(Lateral 2)
9

165

113

11

(Lateral 3)
102

118

165

113

13

Figure 3. Topological relationships within the irrigation community. The consumptive
use right for the season for each irrigator is listed in the relevant field. (Values rounded
from Table 2.)

As mentioned, the model can determine the volumetric deficit an affected irrigator
will loose under TPE. As an example, the graph in Figure 3 shows results of two
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different runs for Field B in Lateral One, the baseline and a run from a scenario where B
feels TPE. In the baseline run, the stock remains equilibrated at zero as shown by the
solid line in the graph in Figure 3. Zero results from the balance of the diversionary right
inflow with the Consumptive Use and return outflows when there are no TPE. In an
example run from scenario one however, irrigator A, located immediately upstream from
B, transferred water out of the basin, causing TPE to B. This is evident in drop in the
equilibrium from zero to a negative value (–0.04 af/day) as shown by the dashed line in
the graph (Figure 3). The total deficit over the 200 days of the season sums to 8af, or
6.8% of B’s 117.7 af/y consumptive water right. Other irrigators see similar drops to a
negative equilibrium whenever TPE causes them a deficit.

0.00

Deficit (af/day)

-0.01

Baseline
Transfer

-0.02

-0.03

-0.04

-0.05
0

50

100

150

200

Days

Figure 4. Graph of sample results. Field B in Lateral One demonstrates no TPE in the
base model and quickly equilibrates to a daily deficit of -0.04 after A has transferred CU
water rights out of the lateral per scenario one.
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Results
The four scenarios were run, with scenarios one (transfer from irrigation to city)
and two (change in point of return flows) being run multiple times and scenario three
(change in place of use) and four (change in time of use) being run once each. Results
for the first two scenarios are summarized in Tables 3-6.
In all four tables, the left hand column indicates the lateral and location of the
seller, and columns A through E indicate who is harmed by an occurrence of TPE. The
sellers are assumed to cause themselves no TPE, thus sellers are shaded in light grey.
Dark grey marks out the D and E columns for laterals one and two, which only have
fields A through C.
A zero value means no TPE were seen. In tables 3 and 5, all other values indicate
the total seasonal deficit when TPE was found. In tables 4 and 6, values indicate the
deficit as a percentage of the farm’s annual (seasonal) consumptive use water right. The
tables only provide values for results for the laterals within which the transfer occurred.
These transfer scenarios were too small to show effects in other laterals, thus all values
not shown are zero.
The first scenario transferred CU water from an irrigator to the city, removing it
from the irrigation system. Nine different versions of this transfer were run. A set of
three transfers by irrigators A, B, or both A and B occurred in each of the three laterals.
Table 3 summarizes the total volumetric deficit over the season for each run and Table 4
shows the deficit as a percentage of the CU right.
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Third Party Effects (deficits in
Lateral Seller A
B
C
D
8.0
0.9
1A
0
0
2A
0
0
6.3
3A
0
2.8
1B
0
1.1
2B
0
0
0
3B
3.0
1 A&B
3.3
2 A&B
0
9.3
3 A&B

af/y) to:
E

2.7

1.8

2.7

Table 3. Scenario one results in acre-feet per year.
Third Party Effects (deficits in
Lateral Seller A
B
C
D
6.8
10.0
1A
0
0
2A
0
0
5.6
3A
0
30.0
1B
0
10.0
2B
0
0
0
3B
31.6
1 A&B
30.0
2 A&B
0
8.3
3 A&B

% CU) to
E

20.0

13.3

20.0

Table 4. Scenario one results as a percentage of Consumptive Use.

As can be seen in Lateral One, seller A’s transfer of CU out of the system caused
TPE to both B and C. However, when the same transfer was run in Lateral Two, seller A
did not cause TPE to either B or C. However, the transfer by B caused TPE to C in both
laterals.
These first two laterals were set up with a similar, but not identical, structure.
Both A and B have a large CU, while C has a smaller requirement. That the model can
distinguish between two similar but non-identical systems is a strong sign of its
feasibility. Additionally, in both laterals, C has a greater deficit when both A and B sell
their water simultaneously than when only A or B sells. That C is harmed by the
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combined actions of A and B is consistent given that C was affected by the individual
actions of A and B in Lateral One, and also by water transfers of B in Lateral Two. It is
also logical that the effect on C would increase with the cumulatively greater amount
transferred out.
In the third lateral, which is larger than either of the first two, the same three
transfers were also run. When irrigator A sold CU out of the system, B and C were fine,
but D and E were effected. When B transfers water, only E is affected, which is
interesting because B has a slightly larger CU than A did. However, B is closer to D and
E than A is, demonstrating the importance of location as well as volume. Lastly, when
both A and B transfer, both D and E are affected as expected from the individual affects
of A and B, which again serves as a check on the results.
The second scenario required a change in return flow locations. A total of eight
versions were run, with A transferring return flows past consecutively increasing groups
of downstream users. Two of the versions are run in each of the first two laterals. These
are transfers past B, and past both B and C. The third lateral has four runs, which include
the two versions just mentioned, and additional transfers past the fields including D and
E. As with the first scenario, multiple runs demonstrate the model’s versatility. Tables 5
and 6 again summarize the total and percentage of deficit.
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Third Party Effects (af/y)
Lateral Diverter Bypassed B
C
D
8.0
0
1A
B
0
0
2A
B
0
0
0
3A
B
9.4
2.4
1A
B&C
0
0
2A
B&C
0
0
0
3A
B&C
0
0
6.3
3A
B,C&D
0
6.3
3A
B,C,D&E 0

E

0

0
0
2.7

Table 5. Scenario two results in acre-feet per year.

Lateral Diverter
1A
2A
3A
1A
2A
3A
3A
3A

Third Party Effects (% of CU)
Bypassed B
C
D
E
6.8
0
B
0
0
B
0
0
0
0
B
7.9
25.4
B&C
0
0
B&C
0
0
0
0
B&C
0
0
5.6
0
B,C&D
0
5.6
20.0
B,C,D&E 0

Table 6. Scenario two results as percentage of Consumptive Use.

As in scenario one, the two similar systems (Laterals One and Two) showed
varying results under similar changes. In Lateral One, A’s bypassing of B harmed B,
while in Lateral Two, the same action by A left B’s water intact. In either case C felt no
TPE, as it still had full benefits of the return flows. Next, when A’s returns bypassed
both B and C, they were both affected in Lateral One, but neither were in Lateral Two.
In Lateral Three, the same two changes in return point just discussed caused no
harm to any of the four other irrigators. This was followed by two additional tests where
A’s return flows also bypassed B, C and D, and then B through E. In the former test,
only D had TPE, and in the later, D and E were both affected. The greater amounts of
water helped buffer the users closer to A, but were insufficient at greater distances.
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The third scenario is a transfer in place and point of use, thus, in both diversion
and return flows. One field (B) in Lateral Three was reset to a fallow state, and then D
transferred use upstream to B. No TPE were found for any of the other irrigators along
the canal. However, given the results of the other scenarios, it may be that results would
have been found if the chain of fields was longer, or the arrangement of CU values was
different.
The fourth and final scenario was based on a change in time rather than location.
In Lateral Three, irrigators B and F were reset to use water only during the early part of
the season. Then, B switched diversionary flow and usage to the second half of the
season. This did cause irrigator F a TPE as expected (4.5 af/y, or 16.7%), since F kept to
the original irrigation schedule.
As absolute values, shortfalls have been fairly small. Including all the scenarios,
they range from 0.9 to 9.4 acre-feet per year. As percentages of consumptive use or
water right, deficits have a larger range of 5.6% to 33.3%. (Consumptive water use
values range from 9.3 af/y to 164.8 af/y, see Table 2.)
Ordering of the values of deficits in absolute numbers and by percent do not
necessarily line up irrigators in the same order. For example, in one of the scenario two
(change in return point) runs, Lateral One irrigator A moves the return point past field C.
The total shortfall felt by C is simultaneously the lowest absolute deficit (2.4 af) and the
highest percentage deficit (25.4% of the 9.5af CU right) of all runs in this particular
scenario.
The impact of the scenarios on any given irrigator is also variable, depending on
the crop and the permanence of the transfer. A shortfall of 25% in an orchard, such as is
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represented by irrigator C in Lateral One (see Table 2 or Figure 3), could kill trees and
ruin the investment, even if it was only a single year transfer. Likewise, farmer E losses a
similar amount, 2.7 af, and feels a fairly large 20% shortfall in scenario two. However E,
who grows oats, could allow part of the field to lay fallow for a year during a temporary
transfer, resuming irrigation the following year.
Sensitivity Analysis
Two sensitivity analyses were run on the irrigation system, sensitivity to
reductions in diversions into the laterals from the river, and sensitivity to increases in CU.
The former could be the result of increasing flow constraints due to a need to meet
compact requirements during a drought, for example, and the later due to increases in
crop ET resulting from increasing temperatures. Sensitivity was tested by stepwise
changes in the percentage of diversion or CU. A deficit was considered to begin to
accrue when the last irrigator (who felt the deficit first) was no longer able to divert their
full allotment.
The three laterals showed differing levels of sensitivity, with the same general
pattern holding for both tests. The longest system (Lateral Three) was the most sensitive.
Lateral One, which draws from the same main diversion as Three, was second, perhaps
due to being part of this larger, more complex system. The simpler, isolated Lateral Two
was the much more robust and didn’t exhibit deficits until a greater amount of change
had occurred. Results for both tests are summarized in Table 7.
Under the first test, Lateral Three showed the first signs of deficits at less than a
one percent decrease. Lateral One held out until after a decrease of over four percent.
Lateral Two survived a greater than 50% decrease. This wide range of sensitivities
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between the One+Three system and Lateral Two is interesting. It seems the greater
number of users or greater complexity of the system (or both) creates a tighter
interdependence, such that shortfalls are felt much sooner.
The sensitivity of the irrigation communities to increasing CU followed a similar
pattern. The largest community, Lateral Three, was again the most sensitive to increases,
with a deficit occurring after an increase of under one-half percent over the original
model. Lateral One followed closely, feeling the deficit at a 5.5% increase, while Lateral
Two held out until a 57.5% increase. This pattern is likely due to the same factors as
discussed for the diversionary test. The differences in percentages between the two tests
indicate that the system’s reaction to different types of restrictions, while similar, cannot
be counted on to be identical.
The values shown in Table 7 represent the percent decrease in diversion (Test 1)
or percent increase in Consumptive Use (Test 2) when TPE are fist felt in the Lateral
indicated.
Lateral
Sensitivity Test 1 (%)
Sensitivity Test 2 (%)

Lateral 1 Lateral 2 Lateral 3
4.4
53.1
0.8
5.5
57.5
0.3

Table 7. Sensitivity of Laterals.

Lastly, one scenario in Lateral Three was chosen for an additional sensitivity test,
as the third lateral is was so sensitive to the original tests. Farm A in canal three was
tested by creating a series of partial transfers of the CU water right (as opposed to the
transfer of the entire right in the original scenario). A deficit occurred by transfer of 25%
of the CU water right. This confirmed that while this lateral had the highest sensitivity to
restrictions to diversions from the river and increases in CU, it is much less sensitive to
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transfers. From a practical perspective, it is fortunate that partial transfers can occur in
reasonable amounts. Any individual water transfer can be sensitivity tested in a similar
manner, which also has the practical aspect of allowing a potential seller to test what
portion of the right can safely be transferred without TPE.
Further Work
Before integration with the Sandia model, this prototype can be improved. One
improvement is to include losses in the fields. In this model, the simplified irrigation
system returns water that is unused by CU to the lateral. However, depending on factors
such as soil and crop, some water may be lost from the system. For example, it may seep
past crop roots. Some of this water can end up as return flows, as is assumed here, but
this is not always the case.
In addition to fine-tuning the prototype, other scenarios remain to be been tested.
For example, if an irrigator moves a diversion further downstream, but remains in the
same position relative to other irrigators, there still may be TPE as the conveyance losses
to the field increase, which means upstream users may have to send more water
downstream [Gould, 1988]. Additionally, flow constraints on the river itself have not yet
been simulated. A larger irrigation community in the upper reach could draw down the
river volume, perhaps leaving the reach dry as does currently happen in parts of the Rio
Grande. Under that scenario, the interconnections between the ‘isolated’ Reach Two and
the upstream systems via the river itself would become apparent. In this case, transfers
out of the system in the upper laterals could easily cause TPE in the lower lateral. This is
one example of a case where TPE would no longer be confined to the lateral within
which the transfer occurred, as is the case with this prototype.
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Water rights priorities also need to be added. There are varying levels of
complexity that could be investigated. For example, a water right could be simply pre- or
post-1907, or rights could be given a relative ranking in order of date. Once rights are in
place, the more senior users can avoid potential TPE by requiring their juniors to forego
irrigation use. This can also transfer the TPE within and outside of individual laterals.
Once the prototype is improved and more scenarios are run, then it is time to
integrate the model with the Sandia model. As the Sandia model has multiple reaches,
scenarios can be run within and between reach irrigation communities in a manner
similar to how they are set up here.
Integration with the Sandia model also allows for more sophisticated modeling
within the irrigation system. Data for CU by crop is available, and CU for the integrated
irrigation system can be calculated by the Penman-Monteith equation, as it is for the
aggregated agricultural ET in the current Sandia model [Passell, et al., 2003]. Watewater
returns could be modeled as a function of population. Other fluxes such as precipitation
can also be modeled in a more sophisticated manner, and the stochastic element of
climate can also be incorporated. Additionally, the prototype’s groundwater fluxes can
be integrated with the functioning groundwater portion of the Sandia model. Integration
with the Sandia model might also allow economic measures to drive water transfer
decisions.
While this model has a daily time step and only runs for one season, Sandia has a
monthly step and runs for decades. This model can also run in a monthly, multi-year
mode by using the graphical function to cycle the irrigation systems on and off. As the
MRG Conservancy District (MRGCD) runs the system from March 1 through October
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31, the cycle would be turned on at the beginning of the third month and off at the end of
the tenth. Diversions to individual fields are already controlled graphically, and would be
set up in a similar fashion. However, they will need additional data points in order to
cycle on and off at fractions of a month. This allows the main canals to be flushed and
filled before irrigation begins. This is the standard practice in the MRGCD, and from a
modeling standpoint, allows the lateral stocks to fill before the field stocks try and pull
water from them.
This discussion makes the integration sound easy, but it will be a challenge.
Some inflows and outflows may indeed be simple to connect into the Sandia model, such
as precipitation. But others will be more difficult. For example, the connections of
groundwater systems will be complex and tricky. Also, the Sandia model has aggregated
agriculture, which will need to be broken out into the irrigation system as shown in this
model, but an aggregated functionality will need to be maintained to allow users to create
the overall changes in agricultural systems they can currently control.
Conclusions
These set of runs are very promising as they demonstrate that simulating TPE is
possible in a dynamic modeling software structure. This simple model should be
expanded to include a more realistic hydrological model of the agricultural section and
more scenarios should be investigated. With continued improvements it is likely to be a
valuable addition to the Sandia model and the public education efforts. Once the final
integrated model is recalibrated, it should be possible to determine how much a given
irrigator can transfer without causing TPE to other users. Hopefully this would provide
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an additional tool to use towards the goal of public education and cooperative water
management in the Middle Rio Grande.
This type of modeling is not restricted to the MRG basin, either. Dynamic
modeling can be used in other western locations where demand for water is exceeding
supply, and can be used for areas ranging from local watersheds to large basins.
Furthermore, it is possible that similar models can be designed to meet the needs of states
or countries that have different legal structures regulating water rights.
Another outcome of this research is the flexibility of dynamic systems modeling.
While systems dynamics is an aspatial modeling software, the interconnections of stocks
and flows along with select additional information allow the creation of complex spatial
topologies. In this instance, modeling irrigation with multiple chains of diversions and
fields allowed the disaggregation of the agricultural community. The addition of lateral
losses to the stock and flow structure of the irrigation canals provided additional
information equivalent to distance.
Furthermore, systems dynamics software is very flexible in allowing the
integration of multiple scales within one model. A stock does not have a preset scale or
resolution. Thus the scale and resolution of different segments of the model is a function
of the model design and the data used in each model segment. For example, the drainage
area of the two reaches is more than 3,000 mi2, while the irrigated area represented by the
lateral complex is only just over 200 acres. The design of the flows drawing water from
the river control interactions between the courser, lower resolution basin and the finer,
higher resolution farms. As a result, these two scales function together seamlessly. Even
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at full size, the irrigation system will not reach the same scale as the overall basin, but the
same controls will apply.
These findings may have implications for other types of water modeling projects,
and very possibly for models of other human-environmental interactions or
environmental processes. Social and natural systems are dynamic and spatial.
Spatiotemporal modeling has been challenging, however, due to the limits of static GIS
software and aspatial systems software. This model has overcome a portion of these
obstacles and demonstrated that the complex multiscale spatial topologies of an irrigation
community can be realistically built in a systems dynamics model.
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Appendix A: STELLA Code
Diversn1B(t) = Diversn1B(t - dt) + (Lateral1B + Ret1A - Div1B - Lateral1C - LL1B) * dt
INIT Diversn1B = 0
INFLOWS:
Lateral1B = Divrsn1A
Ret1A = Div1A-CU1A
OUTFLOWS:
Div1B = WR1B/200
Lateral1C = Diversn1B
LL1B = LatLossDist/200
Diversn1C(t) = Diversn1C(t - dt) + (Lateral1C + Ret1B - Div1C - Lateral1D - LL1C) * dt
INIT Diversn1C = 0
INFLOWS:
Lateral1C = Diversn1B
Ret1B = Div1B-CU1B
OUTFLOWS:
Div1C = WR1C/200
Lateral1D = Diversn1C
LL1C = LatLossDist/200
Diversn2B(t) = Diversn2B(t - dt) + (Lateral2B + Ret2A - DivB_2 - Lateral2C - LL2B) *
dt
INIT Diversn2B = 0
INFLOWS:
Lateral2B = Divrsn2A
Ret2A = DivA_2-CU2A
OUTFLOWS:
DivB_2 = WR2B/200
Lateral2C = Diversn2B
LL2B = LatLossDist_2/200
Diversn2C(t) = Diversn2C(t - dt) + (Lateral2C + Ret2B - DivC_2 - Lateral2D - LL2C) *
dt
INIT Diversn2C = 0
INFLOWS:
Lateral2C = Diversn2B
Ret2B = DivB_2-CU2B
OUTFLOWS:
DivC_2 = WR2C/200
Lateral2D = Diversn2C
LL2C = LatLossDist_2/200
Diversn3C(t) = Diversn3C(t - dt) + (Lat3C + Ret1B_2 - Div3C - Lat3D - LL3C) * dt
INIT Diversn3C = 0
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INFLOWS:
Lat3C = Divrsn3B
Ret1B_2 = Div3B-CU3B
OUTFLOWS:
Div3C = WR3C/200
Lat3D = Diversn3C
LL3C = LatLossDist_2/200
Divrsn1A(t) = Divrsn1A(t - dt) + (Lateral1A - Div1A - Lateral1B - LL1A - Lateral3A) *
dt
INIT Divrsn1A = 0
INFLOWS:
Lateral1A =
(WR1A+WR1B+WR1C+1.15*LatLossDist+(WR3Total+3.85*LatLossDist_2))/200
OUTFLOWS:
Div1A = WR1A/200
Lateral1B = Divrsn1A
LL1A = LatLossDist/200
Lateral3A = (WR3Total+3.85*LatLossDist_2)/200
Divrsn2A(t) = Divrsn2A(t - dt) + (Lateral2A - DivA_2 - Lateral2B - LL2A) * dt
INIT Divrsn2A = 0
INFLOWS:
Lateral2A = (WR2A+WR2B+WR2C)/200+(1.5*LatLossDist_2)/200
OUTFLOWS:
DivA_2 = WR2A/200
Lateral2B = Divrsn2A
LL2A = LatLossDist_2/200
Divrsn3A(t) = Divrsn3A(t - dt) + (Lateral3A - Div3A - Lat3B - LL3A) * dt
INIT Divrsn3A = 0
INFLOWS:
Lateral3A = (WR3Total+3.85*LatLossDist_2)/200
OUTFLOWS:
Div3A = WR3A/200
Lat3B = Divrsn3A
LL3A = LatLossDist/200
Divrsn3B(t) = Divrsn3B(t - dt) + (Lat3B + Ret3A - Div3B - Lat3C - LL3B) * dt
INIT Divrsn3B = 0
INFLOWS:
Lat3B = Divrsn3A
Ret3A = Div3A-CU3A
OUTFLOWS:
Div3B = WR3B/200
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Lat3C = Divrsn3B
LL3B = LatLossDist/200
Divrsn3D(t) = Divrsn3D(t - dt) + (Lat3D + Ret3C - Lat3E - Div3D - LL3D) * dt
INIT Divrsn3D = 0
INFLOWS:
Lat3D = Diversn3C
Ret3C = Div3C-CU3C
OUTFLOWS:
Lat3E = Divrsn3D
Div3D = WR3D/200
LL3D = LatLossDist_2/200
Divrsn3F(t) = Divrsn3F(t - dt) + (Lat3E + Ret3D - Div3F - LL3E - Lateral3F) * dt
INIT Divrsn3F = 0
INFLOWS:
Lat3E = Divrsn3D
Ret3D = Div3D-CU3D
OUTFLOWS:
Div3F = WR3F/200
LL3E = LatLossDist_2/200
Lateral3F = Divrsn3F
Irr1A(t) = Irr1A(t - dt) + (Div1A - CU1A - Ret1A) * dt
INIT Irr1A = 0
INFLOWS:
Div1A = WR1A/200
OUTFLOWS:
CU1A = (0.5*WR1A)/200
Ret1A = Div1A-CU1A
Irr1B(t) = Irr1B(t - dt) + (Div1B - CU1B - Ret1B) * dt
INIT Irr1B = 0
INFLOWS:
Div1B = WR1B/200
OUTFLOWS:
CU1B = (0.5*WR1B)/200
Ret1B = Div1B-CU1B
Irr1C(t) = Irr1C(t - dt) + (Div1C - CU1C - Ret1C) * dt
INIT Irr1C = 0
INFLOWS:
Div1C = WR1C/200
OUTFLOWS:
CU1C = (0.5*WR1C)/200
Ret1C = Div1C-CU1C
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Irr2A(t) = Irr2A(t - dt) + (DivA_2 - CU2A - Ret2A) * dt
INIT Irr2A = 0
INFLOWS:
DivA_2 = WR2A/200
OUTFLOWS:
CU2A = (0.5*WR2A)/200
Ret2A = DivA_2-CU2A
Irr2B(t) = Irr2B(t - dt) + (DivB_2 - CU2B - Ret2B) * dt
INIT Irr2B = 0
INFLOWS:
DivB_2 = WR2B/200
OUTFLOWS:
CU2B = (0.5*WR2B)/200
Ret2B = DivB_2-CU2B
Irr3A(t) = Irr3A(t - dt) + (Div3A - CU3A - Ret3A) * dt
INIT Irr3A = 0
INFLOWS:
Div3A = WR3A/200
OUTFLOWS:
CU3A = (0.5*WR3A)/200
Ret3A = Div3A-CU3A
Irr3B(t) = Irr3B(t - dt) + (Div3B - CU3B - Ret1B_2) * dt
INIT Irr3B = 0
INFLOWS:
Div3B = WR3B/200
OUTFLOWS:
CU3B = (0.5*WR3B)/200
Ret1B_2 = Div3B-CU3B
Irr3C(t) = Irr3C(t - dt) + (Div3C - CU3C - Ret3C) * dt
INIT Irr3C = 0
INFLOWS:
Div3C = WR3C/200
OUTFLOWS:
CU3C = (0.5*WR3C)/200
Ret3C = Div3C-CU3C
Irr3D(t) = Irr3D(t - dt) + (Div3D - CU3D - Ret3D) * dt
INIT Irr3D = 0
INFLOWS:
Div3D = WR3D/200
OUTFLOWS:
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CU3D = (0.5*WR3D)/200
Ret3D = Div3D-CU3D
Irr3F(t) = Irr3F(t - dt) + (Div3F - CU3F - Ret3E) * dt
INIT Irr3F = 0
INFLOWS:
Div3F = WR3F/200
OUTFLOWS:
CU3F = (0.5*WR3F)/200
Ret3E = Div3F-CU3F
IrrC_2(t) = IrrC_2(t - dt) + (DivC_2 - CU2C - Ret2C) * dt
INIT IrrC_2 = 0
INFLOWS:
DivC_2 = WR2C/200
OUTFLOWS:
CU2C = (0.5*WR2C)/200
Ret2C = DivC_2-CU2C
REACH1(t) = REACH1(t - dt) + (RG_Inflow_@_San_Felipe + Trib1 + Precip1 +
GWin1 + Lateral1E - RG - ET1 - GWout1 - Lateral1A) * dt
INIT REACH1 = 1000000
INFLOWS:
RG_Inflow_@_San_Felipe = AvgInflow/365
Trib1 = (JemezR+BernWW+RioRWW)/365
Precip1 = (Rain1*SurfArea1+0.3*Rain1*DrainA1)/365
GWin1 = Recharge1/365
Lateral1E = Return1
OUTFLOWS:
RG = REACH1
ET1 = (RipArea1*RipCURate1+SurfArea1*SurfEvapRate1)/365
GWout1 = Leakage1/365
Lateral1A =
(WR1A+WR1B+WR1C+1.15*LatLossDist+(WR3Total+3.85*LatLossDist_2))/200
REACH2(t) = REACH2(t - dt) + (RG + Trib2 + Precip2 + GWin2 + Lateral2E RG_Outflow_@_Bernardo - ET2 - GWout2 - Lateral2A) * dt
INIT REACH2 = 686000
INFLOWS:
RG = REACH1
Trib2 = (TijerasArroyo+AbqWW+BelenWW+LosLWW)/365
Precip2 = (Rain2*SurfArea2+0.3*Rain2*DrainA2)/365
GWin2 = (0.75*GWout2)
Lateral2E = Return2
OUTFLOWS:
RG_Outflow_@_Bernardo = REACH2
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ET2 = (RipArea2*RipCURate2+SurfArea2*SurfRate2)/365
GWout2 = Leakage2/365
Lateral2A = (WR2A+WR2B+WR2C)/200+(1.5*LatLossDist_2)/200
Return1(t) = Return1(t - dt) + (Lateral1D + Ret1C - Lateral1E - LL1D) * dt
INIT Return1 = 0
INFLOWS:
Lateral1D = Diversn1C
Ret1C = Div1C-CU1C
OUTFLOWS:
Lateral1E = Return1
LL1D = LatLossDist/200
Return2(t) = Return2(t - dt) + (Lateral2D + Ret2C + Lateral3F + Ret3E - LL2D Lateral2E) * dt
INIT Return2 = 0
INFLOWS:
Lateral2D = Diversn2C
Ret2C = DivC_2-CU2C
Lateral3F = Divrsn3F
Ret3E = Div3F-CU3F
OUTFLOWS:
LL2D = LatLossDist_2/200
Lateral2E = Return2
AbqWW = 58200
AvgInflow = 1030000
BelenWW = 938
BernWW = 530
DrainA1 = 1340
DrainA2 = 1790
JemezR = 46000
Leakage1 = 86942
Leakage2 = 163867
LosLWW = 659
Rain1 = 1.232
Rain2 = 1.232
Recharge1 = 65206
RioRWW = 780
RipArea1 = 5590
RipArea2 = 18800
RipCURate1 = 3.63
RipCURate2 = 3.63
SurfArea1 = 1687
SurfArea2 = 3354
SurfEvapRate1 = 5.6
SurfRate2 = 5.53
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TijerasArroyo = 492
WR3Total = WR3A+WR3B+WR3C+WR3D+WR3F
LatLossDist = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.00), (5.00, 10.0), (10.0, 25.0), (15.0, 25.0), (20.0, 25.0), (25.0, 25.0), (30.0, 25.0),
(35.0, 25.0), (40.0, 25.0), (45.0, 25.0), (50.0, 25.0), (55.0, 25.0), (60.0, 25.0), (65.0, 25.0),
(70.0, 25.0), (75.0, 25.0), (80.0, 25.0), (85.0, 25.0), (90.0, 25.0), (95.0, 25.0), (100, 25.0),
(105, 25.0), (110, 25.0), (115, 25.0), (120, 25.0), (125, 25.0), (130, 25.0), (135, 25.0),
(140, 25.0), (145, 25.0), (150, 25.0), (155, 25.0), (160, 25.0), (165, 25.0), (170, 25.0),
(175, 25.0), (180, 25.0), (185, 25.0), (190, 25.0), (195, 25.0), (200, 25.0)
LatLossDist_2 = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.00), (5.00, 25.0), (10.0, 25.0), (15.0, 25.0), (20.0, 25.0), (25.0, 25.0), (30.0, 25.0),
(35.0, 25.0), (40.0, 25.0), (45.0, 25.0), (50.0, 25.0), (55.0, 25.0), (60.0, 25.0), (65.0, 25.0),
(70.0, 25.0), (75.0, 25.0), (80.0, 25.0), (85.0, 25.0), (90.0, 25.0), (95.0, 25.0), (100, 25.0),
(105, 25.0), (110, 25.0), (115, 25.0), (120, 25.0), (125, 25.0), (130, 25.0), (135, 25.0),
(140, 25.0), (145, 25.0), (150, 25.0), (155, 25.0), (160, 25.0), (165, 25.0), (170, 25.0),
(175, 25.0), (180, 25.0), (185, 25.0), (190, 25.0), (195, 25.0), (200, 25.0)
WR1A = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.00), (20.0, 205), (30.0, 205), (40.0, 205), (50.0, 205), (60.0, 205),
(70.0, 205), (80.0, 205), (90.0, 205), (100, 205), (110, 205), (120, 205), (130, 205), (140,
205), (150, 205), (160, 205), (170, 205), (180, 205), (190, 205), (200, 205)
WR1B = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.00), (20.0, 236), (30.0, 236), (40.0, 236), (50.0, 236), (60.0, 236),
(70.0, 236), (80.0, 236), (90.0, 236), (100, 236), (110, 236), (120, 236), (130, 236), (140,
236), (150, 236), (160, 236), (170, 236), (180, 236), (190, 236), (200, 236)
WR1C = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.00), (20.0, 19.0), (30.0, 19.0), (40.0, 19.0), (50.0, 19.0), (60.0, 19.0),
(70.0, 19.0), (80.0, 19.0), (90.0, 19.0), (100, 19.0), (110, 19.0), (120, 19.0), (130, 19.0),
(140, 19.0), (150, 19.0), (160, 19.0), (170, 19.0), (180, 19.0), (190, 19.0), (200, 19.0)
WR2A = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.00), (20.0, 330), (30.0, 330), (40.0, 330), (50.0, 330), (60.0, 330),
(70.0, 330), (80.0, 330), (90.0, 330), (100, 330), (110, 330), (120, 330), (130, 330), (140,
330), (150, 330), (160, 330), (170, 330), (180, 330), (190, 330), (200, 330)
WR2B = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.00), (20.0, 226), (30.0, 226), (40.0, 226), (50.0, 226), (60.0, 226),
(70.0, 226), (80.0, 226), (90.0, 226), (100, 226), (110, 226), (120, 226), (130, 226), (140,
226), (150, 226), (160, 226), (170, 226), (180, 226), (190, 226), (200, 226)
WR2C = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.00), (20.0, 22.0), (30.0, 22.0), (40.0, 22.0), (50.0, 22.0), (60.0, 22.0),
(70.0, 22.0), (80.0, 22.0), (90.0, 22.0), (100, 22.0), (110, 22.0), (120, 22.0), (130, 22.0),
(140, 22.0), (150, 22.0), (160, 22.0), (170, 22.0), (180, 22.0), (190, 22.0), (200, 22.0)
WR3A = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.00), (20.0, 205), (30.0, 205), (40.0, 205), (50.0, 205), (60.0, 205),
(70.0, 205), (80.0, 205), (90.0, 205), (100, 205), (110, 205), (120, 205), (130, 205), (140,
205), (150, 205), (160, 205), (170, 205), (180, 205), (190, 205), (200, 205)
WR3B = GRAPH(TIME)
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(0.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.00), (20.0, 236), (30.0, 236), (40.0, 236), (50.0, 236), (60.0, 236),
(70.0, 236), (80.0, 236), (90.0, 236), (100, 236), (110, 236), (120, 236), (130, 236), (140,
236), (150, 236), (160, 236), (170, 236), (180, 236), (190, 236), (200, 236)
WR3C = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.00), (20.0, 330), (30.0, 330), (40.0, 330), (50.0, 330), (60.0, 330),
(70.0, 330), (80.0, 330), (90.0, 330), (100, 330), (110, 330), (120, 330), (130, 330), (140,
330), (150, 330), (160, 330), (170, 330), (180, 330), (190, 330), (200, 330)
WR3D = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.00), (20.0, 226), (30.0, 226), (40.0, 226), (50.0, 226), (60.0, 226),
(70.0, 226), (80.0, 226), (90.0, 226), (100, 226), (110, 226), (120, 226), (130, 226), (140,
226), (150, 226), (160, 226), (170, 226), (180, 226), (190, 226), (200, 226)
WR3F = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.00), (20.0, 27.0), (30.0, 27.0), (40.0, 27.0), (50.0, 27.0), (60.0, 27.0),
(70.0, 27.0), (80.0, 27.0), (90.0, 27.0), (100, 27.0), (110, 27.0), (120, 27.0), (130, 27.0),
(140, 27.0), (150, 27.0), (160, 27.0), (170, 27.0), (180, 27.0), (190, 27.0), (200, 27.0)
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Appendix B: STELLA Diagrams
The overall layout of the model; individual sections are enlarged following.
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Reach 1
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Reach 2
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Lateral 1

57

Lateral 2
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Lateral 3 (in 2 parts)
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